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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of political economy factors on an illicit capital outflow in the East African 
Community using robust panel data models. The main findings of the study are as follows: An increase in Gross 
Domestic Product is a statistically significant variable and reduces an illicit flow of illegal capital outflow from 
the Community. However, foreign direct investment, total grant and exchange rate statistically significant and 
aggravate the outflow of capital. This is due to poor governance and economic policies that governments favor 
foreign investors over local investors. An aggregate index of poor regulatory quality and government 
ineffectiveness, state fragile index, and the political instability index are statistically significant and positively 
influence an illicit capital flight from the Community. However, the existed perceived corruption level does not 
positively contribute to capital flight, but an intensive corruption level positively influences capital flight overtime, 
bringing a mixed sign of negative and positive depending on the level of corruption that affects capital flight 
overtime in the Community.  The study, therefore, recommends that member countries in the Community need to 
undertake an effective governance and regulatory qualities, political stability and controlling power of corruption 
in order to control capital flight. 
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1. Introduction 
The East African Community that comprises the Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda was formerly 
found in 1967 and latterly revived in 2000 with the objective of Political Federation.  The Community has already 
experienced a common market for capital, labor, goods and service since 2010 as stated under Article 5 (2) of the 
Treaty.  As a result of such integration, the trade performance in the community grew by 40% in 2005-2009. The 
Ugandan and Tanzanian exports to Kenya increased tenfold and triple in 2009, respectively. The 2010 treaty 
among partners highly enhanced the intra-trade in the community. The remarkable performance of the trade is also 
complemented by cross-border investment in the service sector. In a nutshell, the economic performance in the 
community attracts the attentions of development partners as the aggregate GDP increased to USD 75 billion in 
2009 from USD 30 Billion in 2002. Nonetheless, the intra-GDP growth rate remains uneven (EAC, 2011). As a 
result of sustained economic growth, members of the community progress their achievements in terms of reducing 
poverty, child mortality and enhancing universal primary education (Catherine et al., 2012). The existence of 
developed capital market by mobilizing saving and investment is a compulsory requirement in order to lift up and 
sustain the ongoing remarkable performance of the Community. The Community in this regard made an interesting 
progress through eliminating constraints on capital transactions across the Community. However, resource 
mobilization and capital formation face a daunting challenge due to many reasons. One of the main causative 
factors that weaken capital formation and resource mobilization is an illegal capital flight from the Community. 
Though adequate attention paid to capital flight, it still remains a critical problem and adversely affects the 
economic performance of the Community (Boyrie, 2010).  
The Africa Progress Panel Report 2013 shows that the capital flight in Africa exceeds investment in 2008-
2010. The East African Community (EAC) has lost USD 1.2 billion in 2000-2008 in aggregate, showing that 
capital flight is a chronic problem. It weakens not only capital formation, but also it causes economic slowdown, 
leading to a sluggish rate of regional integration and productivity capacity of member countries. The existence of 
sizable illicit capital flight puts on adverse effects on the performance of the economy. It makes the financial sector 
to lose potential resource and negatively affect the balance of payment as well as develop rent-seeking behaviors.  
These place persistent adverse effects on development program of the Community as an illegal capital flight 
weakens the domestic asset of the African countries (Abdilahi and Bernard, 2011).  
EAC Next to Nigeria, the EAC is one of the fastest growing regions in the world in terms of economic growth 
rate and MDG targets. The Community is expected to be the second largest market in Africa in the recent future, 
so that investors are attracted to the regions in order to access the envisaged benefit. In addition to the existing 
liberal African economies, it is also characterized by economic and political stability that lays a fertile ground for 
capital investment, claiming prudent capital market and sound regulatory system for managing capital formation. 
Most research papers have highly paid attentions for economic factors that cause capital flight as they consider 
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capital flight as a portfolio choice. This is in response of discouraging investment climate that bears uncertainty 
and risks associated with investment rate of return (Collier et al., 2001 and Sheets, 1995). However, institutional 
factors like constraints on power exercising, poor governance and lack of political confidence receive a special 
attention in search of sustainable growth nowadays as economic and political elites distort the system of economy 
in general and capital market in particular (Acemoglu et al., 2003 and Dornbusch, 1990).  If this problem is not 
solved shortly, the consequences will not able to be confined within capital market only. It rather negatively affects 
and spreads to the regional integration and development program of the Community. Therefore, the overriding 
objective of the study will be to specify, estimate and analyze the political, economic and institutional factors that 
are responsible for capital flight in the East African Community. The study has the following specific objectives 
to examine political economy and institutional factors that explain capital flight in East African Community 
member countries, and to devise strategies for curbing capital flight based on the key determinants of capital flight 
using a robust panel data model. The outcomes of the study will also be relevant for policy prescriptions on which 
the concerned bodies can design tackling strategies in order to address an illegal capital flight from the Community. 
 
2. Governance and Capital Flight in East Africa Community  
In Sub-Saharan Africa region, the amount of the outflow of capital was projected around USD 24.7 billion, which 
accounts for 7.5 percent of their aggregate GDP, in 1990-2005. The EAC also has a significant share in this regard. 
For instance, according to the data estimated by the Global Financial Security for the period 2000-2008, the EAC 
has lost USD 1.2 billion, on average, in the form of capital flight, of which Uganda accounts for USD 429 million, 
Kenya USD 205 million, Tanzania USD 367 million, Burundi USD 49 million, and Rwanda USD 95 million on 
average.  In terms of cumulative capital flight, the African LDCs accounts for 69 percent of total capital outflow 
from the world LDCs, followed by Asia (29 percent) and Latin America (2 percent). This approximate to US$197 
billion flowed out of the 48 poorest developing countries. Out of which, the total capital outflow from Uganda is 
USD 8.8 billion that makes the country categorized within the top ten LDC countries that illegally export capital 
in 1990-2008. Tanzania also lost USD 2.3 billion, Rwanda USD 1.6 billion, and Burundi USD 969 million in the 
same reference period.  
Moreover, most influential investors and politician are suspected to siphon off domestic money into offshore 
tax haven and developed countries out of the poorer countries. For instance, the EAC countries have lost USD 1.3 
billion in terms of tax havens in Swiss banks, of which Kenya accounts for USD 857 million. Next to Kenya, 
Tanzania accounts for USD 178 million, followed by Uganda USD 159 and Rwanda 29.7 million. Burundi 
however accounts for USD 16.7 million capital flight from EAC and deposited in the Swiss banks 
(http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke).  
On top of this bad performance of capital formation, the worldwide governance indicators indicate the 
existence of poor governance as measured with six dimensions of governance.  All indicators reflect how the 
people perceive towards each dimension. Note that the estimate of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.  
Table 1: - The Worldwide Governance Indicators in 2012 
Member 
Countries 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators in 2012 
Voice and 
Accountabil
ity 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/Terroris
m 
Governme
nt 
Effectiven
ess 
Regulatory 
Quality 
 
Rule of 
Law 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
 
Burundi -0.93 -1.68 -1.33 -0.96 -1.09 -1.46 
Kenya -0.30 -1.29 -0.55 -0.31 -0.87 -1.10 
Rwanda -1.24 -0.21 -0.06 -0.10 -0.26 0.66 
Tanzania -0.22 0.03 -0.69 -0.40 -0.58 -0.85 
Uganda -0.49 -0.89 -0.57 -0.24 -0.36 -0.95 
Source: - World Bank, www.govindicators.org 
The community economic performance is challenged by capital flight and poor governance. These slow down 
the partner countries’ efforts to reach their expected outcomes of regional integration and intensify economic 
stagnation in the long run in terms of balance of payment disequilibria, poverty, deteriorating government finances, 
increasing macroeconomic and political instability (collier, 2006). Moreover, a significant outflow of capital from 
the community also forces the governments to borrow in a continuous way, leading to high debt burden, shortage 
of foreign currency reserve and exchange rate fluctuation. It also adversely affects the investment climate and 
infrastructural development that contribute much towards Community integration. The structural and institutional 
developments are also affected by the illegal capital outflow as the economic and political elites take their own 
advantage at the cost of the country, negatively impacts on wealth distribution (Epstein 2005).  On the other side, 
by the time economic and political elites lose their confidence over capital they hold, the ensuing capital flight 
causes higher interest rate and exchange rate depreciation as there is a shortage of loanable fund and foreign 
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currency reserve, respectively. If the problem is not treated wisely, it could bring currency crash, skyrocket interest 
rates, bad foreign debt and macroeconomic disruption. These all consequences could slow investment and thereby 
capital formation, putting a negative repercussion on the rate of economic growth.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
Capital flight is an illegal outflow of capital from a given country in terms of trade mispricing (under invoicing 
export bill and over invoicing import bill), smuggling goods, antiques, precious metal, cash movements, bribery 
in the form of corruption in various deals and swap arrangements, bank transfers and  the like (Bhagwati, 1964; 
Cerven, 2006 and Schneider, 2001). Understanding the broad definition of capital flight, there are two basic 
theoretical framework of conceptualizing capital flight: - economic framework and institutional framework.  
In the economic framework, many scholars consider four dimensions and hypotheses in order to 
conceptualize the causative factors of capital flight. The first one is a portfolio choice framework that pays more 
attention to the incentives of relative risk diversification and return differential as triggering factors for an illegal 
outflow of capital (Ajayi, 1992). However, the second framework, which is called an investment diversion thesis, 
focuses on diversion of investment towards a more stable economic and political condition in developed countries. 
This is due to the existence of political and macroeconomic risk in a given country that have worst investment 
opportunities (Forgham, 2008). Moreover, the third framework in light of debt-driven flight thesis or debt overhang 
thesis proposes that capital flight is highly intensified with the existence of heavy external debt. The intuition 
behind heavy debt is that the ensuing problems of devaluation, fiscal crisis, crowding out and expropriation of 
assets to pay for the foreign debt fuels up capital flight. It entails further borrowing and foreign dependency. The 
last framework is a Tax-Depressing Thesis. It postulates that an illegal outflow of capital leads to loss of tax 
revenue, which in turn reduces debt service and further accumulates debt burden (Ajayi, 1992). In a nutshell, 
external borrowing and debt (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003), evolution of capital flight (Cerra et al., 2008 and 
Nyoni, 2000), inflation (Dooley, 1988), economic growth (Morgan Guaranty, 1988), financial development 
(Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003 and Collier et al., 2001), black market premium (Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo, 
2004) are likely the determinants of capital flight. 
In the institutional framework, more weight is given to institutional factors that triggering capital flight such 
as constraints on the power of the enforcement and political confidence of elites (Acemoglu et al., 2003 and 
Dornbusch, 1990).  The lack of strong institutional system and good governance expose elites to corrupt the capital 
market at the cost of the national interest (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003). As a result, poor institutional quality 
including weak democracy and political freedom aggravates an illegal outflow of capital from poor countries, 
diverting scarce resource from injecting the development pipeline (Lensink et al., 2000). Political instability and 
conflict also attribute a negative repercussion to capital market and induce residents to move their assets out of the 
country as they fear the volatile political situation that increase risk of losing rate of return on domestic assets 
(Ndiaye, 2009). Moreover, by the time they do not have trust on the certainty of government policy overtime; 
residents choose to make a decision of moving their assets out country as they experienced variability in interest 
rate, tax rate and fiscal deficit (Hermes and Lensik, 2001).  
 
4. Model Specification for Capital Flight and Estimation Technique 
Model specification for capital flight considers assumptions, style of estimation techniques and level of 
development of a given country.  Both theoretical and empirical literatures suggest the potential factors that are 
responsible for an illegal outflow of capital are economic factors and governance quality factors. The study 
considers inflation, GDP, FDI, total grants, fiscal deficit and foreign exchange rate as the major economic 
determinants of capital flight in EAC. On top of these economic factors, it also incorporates corruption indices, 
regulator quality, government effectiveness, political instability, and state fragmentation index as the major factors 
that explain governance quality. This specification of the capital flight model is supported by the research papers 
conducted by Dooley (1988), Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), Cerra et al. (2008), Nyoni (2000), Collier, Hoeffler 
and Pattillo (2004), Seung, (2010) and Thomas (2010).  
The final model of capital flight, therefore, is presented below: 
KFit = β0 +β1INFti + β2GDPit + β3FDIit + β4TGit + β5FXit + β6CPCit + β7 (CPC)2it + 
β8GOVREGINDit+β9FISDEFit + β10POLITY2it + β10SFIit + εit……………………………………….…(.1) 
Where KF=Capital Flight, GDP= Gross Domestic Product, FDI= Foreign Direct Investment, TG=Total Grant 
including technical support, FX= Official Exchange Rate, CPC=Corruption Index, CPC2=Intensity of Corruption 
Index, GOVREGIND=Aggregated Index of Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality, FISDEF= Fiscal 
Deficit, POLITY2= Political Instability Index, SFI= State Fragility Index, and ε= the error term. 
Based on the theoretical and empirical evidences, foreign resources (foreign grant and FDI) positively 
influence capital flight as the government provides favorable policy to foreign investors over local investors, 
forcing the domestic investors to move out their money.  Otherwise, the inflow of foreign resources has a negative 
relationship with capital flight if there is the attractive investment climate. On the same note, if the government 
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utilizes aid effectively, it reduces capital outflow. If not, capital flight increases over time.  Regarding GDP, when 
the economy grows higher, it is an incentive to domestic investors so that they prefer to invest home, reducing 
capital flight. This indicates there is a negative relationship between GDP and capital flight. The higher official 
exchange rate positively affects capital flight as domestic currency is devalued and the relationship between fiscal 
deficit and capital flight is also positive as deficit leads to a higher tax. Regarding governance quality indicators, 
all of them (poor government and regulatory index, higher corruption index, state fragile index and political 
instability aggravates an illegal outflow of capital from domestic economy. In a nutshell, it is only foreign resource 
that has a mixed impact on capital flight, depending on the utilization capacity of the economy and discriminatory 
policies.  Note that all data are available from WB, IMF, UNCATAD, Global Report 2011 and Plity- 4 Project 
(Annex 1). 
As the study considers the five members of the EAC, panel data modelling is appropriate in order to capture 
the heterogeneity and country-specific nature of the determinants of capital flight. The panel model controls the 
effects of unobserved variables of complexity of each country, namely– business practices, policies, regulations, 
social and the like country heterogeneity.  However, it is not possible to use dynamic panel data model as the 
number of cross section does not exceed the number of years, N<T.  The paper therefore employs a static panel 
date model of fixed effects and random effect.  
The Fixed Effect model can be estimated by Within-group method, First Difference Method, and Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) method.  The first two methods eliminate time-invariant characteristics and 
heterogeneity character of cross-sections so that they enable us to examine the net effect of explanatory variables 
that vary over time. However, the LSDV method introduces dummy variables for each cross-section in order to 
capture heterogeneity of each country. In summary, the assumption of Fixed Effect model is that all time-invariant 
characteristics of one country must not be correlated with characteristics of other country, error terms and 
individual characteristics are not correlated across countries.  The specification of Fixed Effect model is presented 
as follows. The general form of panel data model is defined in equation 2 
0 1it it i itY x       ……………………….…………………………………………………………….. (2) 
Where Y is dependent variable, X is explanatory variables,  is country-specific explanatory variables or 
unobserved variable /heterogeneity, i is unit of observation, t  is time, and   error term.  Equation 2 is called 
pooled or reference regression model.  It is also possible to reformulate equation 2 in terms of the mean value of 
each variable within the group for each country in order to catch up the long run time effect in the model, it is said 
to be Between or Time Effect model.  
0 1i i i iY x       ………………………………………………………………………………………. (3) 
Note that i

 is an unaffected as it has unique characteristics to each country over time remain the same overtime. 
The coefficient in equation indicates the long run impact of explanatory variables on outcome variable. Subtracting 
equation 2 from equation 1 gives Fixed Effect within Group Model that capture individual effect as follows. 
1( ) ( )it i it i it iY y x x       ……………………………………………………………..…………….. (4) 
The coefficients in this regards measure the impact of variation in explanatory variable on the variation of outcome 
variable, indicating the short run impact. The other method, on the other hand, proposes the first difference method 
by taking one lag period of equation 2, and gives the following equation. 
1 0 1 1 1it it i itY x         ………………………………………………………………………………… (5) 
Note that the lag value of Error! Bookmark not defined.is the same to the level value as it is time invariant 
variable.  Subtracting equation 5 from equation 2 gives us First Difference Method of Fixed Effect Mode 
. 
………….…………………………………..………… (6) 
 
In equation 6, the trend component is removed and there may have an autocorrelation problem as the error terms 
are correlated with each other in terms of the MA or AR process. Both equations 4 and 6 exclude the unobserved 
and heterogeneity variables out of the specification of panel model.  The third Fixed Effect method of LSDV, 
however, addresses this flaw and introduces dummy variables for each country in order to capture country-specific 
characteristics. Equation 2 in this regard can be rewritten as in the following way. 
0 1it it i i itY x D       ………………………………………………………………………………… (7) 
Where i i
D
 is dummy variable for each country, i i
D
=1 if an individual country has a particular characteristics, 
and i i
D
=0, otherwise. The unobserved effect is now being treated as the coefficient of the individual-specific 

1 0 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )it it it it it itY Y x x          
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dummy variable. Note that if we include a dummy variable for every individual in the sample, we will fall into the 
dummy variable trap. To avoid this, we could define one individual to be the reference category, so that ß0 is its 
intercept, and then treat the Di as the shifts in the intercept for the other individuals. However, the choice of 
reference category is often arbitrary. Alternatively, we can drop the ß0 intercept and define dummy variables for 
all of the individuals. In the entire Fixed Effect model, the error terms are not correlated by assumption. However, 
if they are correlated, the Fixed Effect model is not useful, leading to incorrect inference. Therefore, Random 
Effect model can be used for treating the situation where error terms are correlated. Contrary to Fixed Effect 
models, variations across countries are also considered as random and uncorrelated with explanatory variables so 
that such variation across countries (time invariant variables) is included in the model as a part of the error terms 
as shown in equation 8. 
 0 1it it it
Y x    
………………………………………………………………………………………….. (8) 
Where it i it
   
, i

is time-invariant or heterogeneity variable, and it

is error term. Assuming the 
expected value is zero for each component, the variance of
var( ) var( ) var( )it i it    , but 
cov( , )i it   is 
zero. If
var( ) var( )i it  , Random Effect model is recommended whereas if
var( ) var( )i it  , Fixed 
Effect Model is recommended. The Fixed Effect model makes two important assumptions about time 
invariant/heterogeneity/unobserved individual characteristics. The first one is time-invariant variables may have 
an impact of explanatory and dependent variables. Therefore, the Fixed Effect model examines the relationship of 
dependent and explanatory variables within a country by removing and controlling time-invariant individual 
characteristics in order to capture the net effect of explanatory variables. The second assumption is that time-
invariant variables are not correlated across countries and unique to each country so that error terms are also 
uncorrelated across countries. If these two assumptions are failed, the Random Effect model is preferable. The 
Hausman test is an important test to choose whether fixed or random model. 
 
5. Econometrics Result and Analysis 
On the basis of static panel data model with different estimation methods,  this section of the study present the 
three major parts of econometric results such as descriptive analysis, econometric analysis, and post estimation 
diagnostic test. Let us see turn by turn. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and Analysis 
Table 2 gives a summary of descriptive statistics of central tendency and measure of variability. The mean value 
indicates the average value of each variable in the overall model. The distribution of data around the average value 
can also be captured by the standard deviation that shows the closeness of data to mean value over the reference 
period of 1996- 2010 On top of this, the range also gives some clue about the spread of data by measuring the 
difference between the maximum and minimum values in each different model. 
Table 2: - Descriptive statistics 
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Source: - Author computations using SATAT 
N.B: - Kf is capital flight, Inf is inflation rate, gdp is Gross Domestic Product, fx is foreign exchange rate, cpc is 
corruption index, sqcc is the square of corruption index, govregrd is an aggregate index of government and 
regulatory quality, fisdef is fiscal deficit, polity2 is index of political instability, and sfi is an index of state fragility. 
Specifically, the heterogeneity of capital flight across EAC countries varies with countries. Kenya in this 
regard has a highest variation against the mean value of capital flight while Tanzania has the lowest variation of 
capital flight that moves around the mean (Figure 1). Note that 1 denotes Burundi, 2 for Kenya, 3 for Tanzania, 4 
for Rwanda and 5 for Uganda. 
Figure 1: - Heterogeneity across countries  
 
Source: - Source: - Author computations using SATAT 
In the same manner, the heterogeneity of capital flight across years also provides the entire distribution of 
capital flight data around the mean overtime. It indicates that capital flight in EAC has been spread with an 
increasing variation since 2000, where EAC was reformed in the recent context. 
  
. 
         within                1.978716   13.93333   20.46667       T =      15
         between               3.456716   13.46667   20.86667       n =       5
sfi      overall    17.33333   3.688306         11         24       N =      75
                                                               
         within                3.011988  -9.013333   3.986667       T =      15
         between               3.252828  -4.066667        3.6       n =       5
polity2  overall   -.4133333    4.20133         -6          8       N =      75
                                                               
         within                2.48e+10  -1.24e+11   3.19e+10       T =      15
         between               1.53e+10  -3.31e+10  -1.98e+09       n =       5
fisdef   overall   -1.81e+10   2.83e+10  -1.39e+11   1.76e+10       N =      75
                                                               
         within                .3501963   .0138667   2.303867       T =      15
         between               .8447324   .4793333      2.612       n =       5
govreg~d overall    1.238533   .8373828        .16       3.02       N =      75
                                                               
         within                 .294427   .1258187   1.639919       T =      15
         between               .3159911   .3284133   1.171033       n =       5
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         between               2.43e+08    1338219   5.63e+08       n =       5
fdi      overall    2.15e+08   3.03e+08       10.7   1.38e+09       N =      75
                                                               
         within                2.25e+09   3.25e+09   1.46e+10       T =      15
         between               6.21e+09   7.88e+08   1.46e+10       n =       5
gdp      overall    7.78e+09   6.03e+09   6.90e+08   2.00e+10       N =      75
                                                               
         within                5.720123  -2.691573   27.20843       T =      15
         between               2.353146   6.172133     12.468       n =       5
inf      overall    8.576427    6.09996      -2.42       31.1       N =      75
                                                               
         within                840.9573  -2746.948   3863.052       T =      15
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Figure 2: - Heterogeneity across years 
 
Source: - Source: - Author computations using SATAT 
 
5.2  Panel Model Econometrics Results 
The macro econometric panel model here gives a result of both fixed effect and random effect models. The between 
the method for the fixed effect model is not included here since it is highly affected by multicollinearity problem 
and the system failed to work.  On top of this, the study finds that heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are a 
severe problem associated with each panel model. Therefore, the study uses and presents the robust model after 
controlling both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Fixed Effect Model of Capital Flight:  
Table 3 gives us fixed effect (within) regression result. From the result, we can understand that the R2 for within, 
between, and overall effect model is 36 percent, 33 percent and 5percent, respectively. As R2 for the within effect 
is the highest among them, it tells that individual and short run effect is more important than time and long run 
effect in EAC capital flight. The corr (u-1, xb) = -0.9886 shows that the negative correlation between error terms 
and explanatory variable and this ensures the assumption of fixed effects model in this regard. All explanatory 
variables are jointly statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance and adequate enough to explain 
change in capital flight.   
Table 3:- Regression Result of Within Effect Method 
 
Source: - Regression result based on within effect method 
Except inflation rate, fiscal deficit and the square value corruption index, all explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at 1 percent and 5 percent level of significance and capable of explaining change in capital 
flight in EAC member countries.  We also learn that an increase in the size of the economy in terms of GDP puts 
on a negative implication for an illegal flow of capital from the EAC countries, attributing to the fact that capital 
holders prefer to invest home in order to reap remarkable profits following sustainable economic growth. Both the 
inflow of FDI and total grant positively contribute to capital flight from the Community member countries, 
reflecting foreign resources are highly associated with capital flight and widening the bribery circumstances that 
-2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
1995 2000 2005 2010
t
kf kf_mean1
F test that all u_i=0:     F(4, 59) =     3.95               Prob > F = 0.0066
                                                                              
         rho    .96285463   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    749.01082
     sigma_u    3813.4328
                                                                              
       _cons    -1687.258   2289.831    -0.74   0.464    -6269.198    2894.683
         sfi       176.78   99.01015     1.79   0.079    -21.33884    374.8989
     polity2     122.6579   44.27134     2.77   0.007     34.07114    211.2446
      fisdef    -2.04e-09   6.90e-09    -0.30   0.769    -1.58e-08    1.18e-08
   govregind     1261.735   541.9275     2.33   0.023     177.3408    2346.129
        sqcc     1593.994   1150.112     1.39   0.171     -707.374    3895.362
         cpc    -3420.611   1807.198    -1.89   0.063    -7036.805    195.5838
          fx     1.565629   .7081663     2.21   0.031     .1485914    2.982666
          tg     3.90e-07   1.44e-07     2.71   0.009     1.02e-07    6.78e-07
         fdi     2.01e-06   7.94e-07     2.53   0.014     4.18e-07    3.60e-06
         gdp    -4.36e-07   1.34e-07    -3.27   0.002    -7.04e-07   -1.69e-07
         inf     9.664607    18.3268     0.53   0.600    -27.00724    46.33646
                                                                              
          kf        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9886                        Prob > F           =    0.0023
                                                F(11,59)           =      3.12
       overall = 0.0502                                        max =        15
       between = 0.3318                                        avg =      15.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.3675                         Obs per group: min =        15
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         5
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        75
. xtreg  kf inf gdp fdi tg fx  cpc sqcc govregind fisdef polity2 sfi, fe cluster()
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pushes scarce capital to go out from countries. On top of foreign resource, exchange rate also one the influencing 
factor that the capital owners taking into account where they allocate their capital at hand. The fixed model 
indicates that an increase in foreign exchange rate leads to reducing the value of domestic currency and 
encouraging holding capital in terms of foreign currency. In the presence of scarce foreign currency, capital owners 
then move their capital out of the country at the situation of currency devaluation.  This enables us to conclude 
that capital flight and foreign exchange rate have a positive relationship.  
The various dimensions of governance quality also reveal that capital flight is also explained by poor 
regulatory and government performance as well as the existence of recurrent political instability. Indicators of an 
aggregate index of regulatory quality and government effectiveness and an index of political instability positively 
influence an illicit capital flight. This is definitely right in a case of poor countries as they have poor governance 
qualities that widely pave a way to an illegal outflow of capital. Regarding the corruption index, the existed 
perceived corruption does not positively contribute to capital flight, but an intensive corruption positively 
influences capital flight overtime, bringing a mixed sign of negative and positive depending on the level of 
corruption that affects capital flight overtime in the EAC member countries. The rho1 that measures the intraclass 
correlation shows that 96.2% of the variance is due to difference across panels, heterogeneity effect. This indicates 
that each member of EAC country has no similar time invariant characteristics so that they are well considered for 
policy prescription.  
In order to capture the effect of individual country on capital flight, it is more suitable to employ LSDV 
method.  The model introduces constant terms and creates dummy variables for all countries except Burundi. Cross 
section 1 for Burundi, 2 stands for Kenya, 3 for Rwanda, 4 for Tanzania and 5 for Uganda. Table 4 gives details 
results in this regard by keeping the coefficients and level of statistical significance the same for all explanatory 
variables as the within method gives earlier. Country-specific characteristics are statistically significant and have 
positive impacts on capital flight, reflecting they are strong enough to explain change in capital flight. 
Table 4: - Regression Result of Lease Square Dummy Variable Method 
 
Source: - Regression result based on within effect method 
 
Random Effect Model of Capital Flight: -  
It captures information over time and across countries, so that the coefficients are used to predict changes over 
time and explain countries difference, including both within individual effects and between individual effects. This 
implies that the data represents the average effects of independent variables over capital flight. In this regard, the 
average effects of total grants and fiscal deficit are statistically significant and positively contribute to an illegal 
flow of capital flow from the ECA. The residual variable is assumed to be uncorrelated with explanatory variables, 
indicating difference across units is uncorrelated with explanatory variables. The Wald chi2 =20.66 with a 
probability of zero shows to test whether all the coefficients in the model are different from zero.  Accordingly, it 
is greater than the tabulated F-test value; we reject the null hypothesis that states the entire coefficients together 
equal to zero. Said differently, as the probability of getting chi2 test of 20.66 is zero, this is less than 0.05, we 
reject the null hypothesis. All the coefficients are different from zero. The Wald test also confirms that all 
explanatory variables are able to jointly and statistically explain the change in capital flight (Table 5). 
Table 5: - Regression Result of Random Effect Method 
                                                           
1 Note that 
2
2 2
( _ )
( _ ) ( _ )
sigma u
rho
sigma u sigma e


, Sigma_u = Standard deviation of residuals within group and Sigma_e=Standard 
deviation of residuals of overall model. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -6452.607   2574.858    -2.51   0.015    -11604.89   -1300.328
      _Iid_5     4744.071    1676.59     2.83   0.006     1389.222    8098.919
      _Iid_4     7072.845   1900.039     3.72   0.000     3270.876    10874.81
      _Iid_3     2326.431   867.8135     2.68   0.010     589.9397    4062.921
      _Iid_2     9683.399   2494.971     3.88   0.000     4690.973    14675.82
         sfi       176.78   99.01015     1.79   0.079    -21.33884    374.8989
     polity2     122.6579   44.27134     2.77   0.007     34.07114    211.2446
      fisdef    -2.04e-09   6.90e-09    -0.30   0.769    -1.58e-08    1.18e-08
   govregind     1261.735   541.9275     2.33   0.023     177.3408    2346.129
        sqcc     1593.994   1150.112     1.39   0.171     -707.374    3895.362
         cpc    -3420.611   1807.198    -1.89   0.063    -7036.805    195.5838
          fx     1.565629   .7081663     2.21   0.031     .1485914    2.982666
          tg     3.90e-07   1.44e-07     2.71   0.009     1.02e-07    6.78e-07
         fdi     2.01e-06   7.94e-07     2.53   0.014     4.18e-07    3.60e-06
         gdp    -4.36e-07   1.34e-07    -3.27   0.002    -7.04e-07   -1.69e-07
         inf     9.664607    18.3268     0.53   0.600    -27.00724    46.33646
                                                                              
          kf        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    55727815.8    74  753078.592           Root MSE      =  749.01
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2550
    Residual    33100015.2    59  561017.207           R-squared     =  0.4060
       Model    22627800.6    15  1508520.04           Prob > F      =  0.0035
                                                       F( 15,    59) =    2.69
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      75
i.id              _Iid_1-5            (naturally coded; _Iid_1 omitted)
. xi: regress  kf inf gdp fdi tg fx  cpc sqcc govregind fisdef polity2 sfi  i.id, cluster()
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Source: - Regression result based on within effect method 
We can also understand that the R2 for within, between, and overall effect model is 20 percent, 96 percent, 
and 24 percent, respectively. As R2 for the between effect is highest, it tells that the time effect is more important 
than individual effect, we can say that the long run effect is more important than short run effect. Controlling the 
effect of heterogeneity and autocorrelation, the rho shows that zero percent of variance is due to difference across 
panels, heterogeneity effect.  Note that ‘rho’ is known as the interaclass correlation.  
 
Which One Do We Choose? Fixed or Random 
To decide between fixed or random effects, we can run a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the 
preferred model is Random Effect vs. the alternative the Fixed Effects. It is basically tests whether the unique 
errors are correlated with the regressors; the null hypothesis is they are not. As mentioned above, random effects 
coefficients have a dual nature: They simultaneously explain change over time and the cross-sectional differences 
among units. The implicit assumption is that both types of effects are the same.  We test this assumption using the 
Hausman test. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less efficient. If the prob. >chi2 is less 
than 0.05, it is statistically significant so that we need to use the Fixed Model. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis 
states that fixed effects and random effects coefficients are significantly same, we prefer to pick fixed effect model. 
Table 6: Hausman Test 
 
Source: - Hausman Test result 
Comparing these coefficients to the fixed effects coefficients in the Hausman output, we can identify variables 
responsible for the some major differences.  We could also estimate the two types of effects (over time and across 
units) separately in a single random effects model using the same kind of person-specific mean variables and mean-
differenced variables that we created when examining fixed effects models (this is only done for time-varying 
variables). Examining the coefficients, we might suspect that variables that have a positive difference are 
responsible for the difference (b-B).   
 
Other Diagnostics Tests: 
No research can conclude the results of regression analysis without considering a range of diagnostic tests for 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, normality, goodness-to-fit and the like. The diagnostic tests assist to detect the 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    749.01082
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -1543.544   1836.097    -0.84   0.401    -5142.229     2055.14
         sfi     61.91679   82.73575     0.75   0.454    -100.2423    224.0759
     polity2     38.49598   32.38651     1.19   0.235    -24.98042    101.9724
      fisdef     1.31e-08   6.05e-09     2.16   0.031     1.22e-09    2.49e-08
   govregind     -84.8855   238.9836    -0.36   0.722    -553.2847    383.5137
        sqcc    -718.6162   887.3171    -0.81   0.418    -2457.726    1020.493
         cpc     1344.216   1201.272     1.12   0.263    -1010.233    3698.666
          fx     .0440774    .319685     0.14   0.890    -.5824937    .6706486
          tg     3.88e-07   1.52e-07     2.55   0.011     9.00e-08    6.85e-07
         fdi     5.22e-07   6.74e-07     0.77   0.439    -8.00e-07    1.84e-06
         gdp    -1.11e-08   7.78e-08    -0.14   0.886    -1.64e-07    1.41e-07
         inf    -2.809356   19.31408    -0.15   0.884    -40.66426    35.04555
                                                                              
          kf        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0370
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(11)      =     20.66
       overall = 0.2470                                        max =        15
       between = 0.9654                                        avg =      15.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2011                         Obs per group: min =        15
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =         5
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        75
. xtreg  kf inf gdp fdi tg fx  cpc sqcc govregind fisdef polity2 sfi, re cluster()
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0099
                          =       13.31
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         sfi        176.78     61.91679        114.8632        69.23711
     polity2      122.6579     38.49598         84.1619        35.75105
      fisdef     -2.04e-09     1.31e-08       -1.51e-08        4.47e-09
   govregind      1261.735     -84.8855        1346.621        539.9773
        sqcc      1593.994    -718.6162         2312.61        884.9628
         cpc     -3420.611     1344.216       -4764.827        1560.314
          fx      1.565629     .0440774        1.521551        .7022998
          tg      3.90e-07     3.88e-07        2.35e-09        4.02e-08
         fdi      2.01e-06     5.22e-07        1.48e-06        5.42e-07
         gdp     -4.36e-07    -1.11e-08       -4.25e-07        1.23e-07
         inf      9.664607    -2.809356        12.47396         5.07368
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        variables so that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your
        there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
        of coefficients being tested (11); be sure this is what you expect, or
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (4) does not equal the number
. hausman fixed random, sigmamore
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inadequacy of the model and identify the strengths and weakness of the model. They also reduce the probability 
of wrongly rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis. One of the interesting points of diagnostic test is to check 
whether time fixed effects are required or not. The null hypothesis testing in this regard states that time fixed 
effects are not needed if the dummies for all years are jointly equal to zero. Accordingly, we accept the null 
hypothesis as the probability of F-test is 0.4898 when we use the command testparm (Annex 2).  On the other hand, 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier also indicates that we accept the null hypothesis and suggest that random 
effect model is not suitable for our cases, reflecting the inexistence of significant difference across countries 
(Annex 3). The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test is also important to run testing for cross-sectional 
dependence or contemporaneous correlation. Most of macro panel data faces such cross-sectional dependence, 
leading to bias in test results. Accordingly, we accept the null hypothesis that states residuals across countries are 
not correlated so that there no cross-sectional dependence (Annex 4). The Pasaran test also confirms the same 
conclusion about the inexistence of cross-sectional dependence (Annex 5). 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The East African Community is one of the emerging and encouraging economic integrations with the objective of 
political federation. However, it is highly challenged by the existing capital flight in weakening capital formation 
and intensifies capital scarcity. This puts a negative pressure on economic growth and economic transformation 
process.  The community has lost a huge amount of foreign capital in last decades. Uganda, for instance, has lost 
USD 8.8 billion and became one of the top ten LDC countries that illegally export capital in 1990-2008.  Taking 
only Swiss Banks, the EAC countries have lost USD 1.3 billion in terms of tax haven. On top of this, the 
community has been poor in all dimensions of governance indicators- severe corruption, poor governance, weak 
regulatory performance, political instability and the like.   
In order to address the critical causes of such an illegal form of capital flight, the study uses a robust panel 
model based on data for the period 1996- 2010.  After controlling the effect of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, 
and cross-sectional dependence, the robust panel model, generate very conclusive results in figuring out the 
statistically significant political economic and institutional factors. Accordingly, all explanatory variables - GDP, 
foreign direct investment and grant, exchange rate, an aggregate index of regulator quality and governance 
effectiveness, political instability, state fragile index, and corruption index are statistically significant at 1 percent 
and 5 percent level of significance and capable of explaining change in capital flight in EAC member countries.  
However, inflation rate, fiscal deficit and the corruption intensity index are not statistically significant in order to 
explain capital flight in the EAC.  
It also indicates that a remarkable economic growth, as measured by GDP, plays a pivotal role in curbing an 
illegal flow of capital from the EAC countries. Otherwise, domestic investors opt to put and invest their capital in 
the place where there is stable economic growth. On the same note, the inflow of FDI and total grant aggravate 
the outflow of capital illegally on account of discriminatory policies and due to lack of enabling investment climate 
for local investors. Exchange rate also one the influencing factor as investors illegally move their capital out of the 
country at the situation of currency devaluation.  On top of economic factors, both institutional and political factors 
are important in explaining capital flight and should not be ignored at all.  The absence of effective governance, 
regulatory quality, political stability and state solidarity are statistically significant and aggravate an illicit outflow 
of capital from the Community. However, the impacts of corruption depend on the intensity of corruption level, 
implying the existed perceived corruption does not positively contribute to capital flight, but an intensive 
corruption index, as measured by square of corruption index, positively influences capital flight overtime. 
The findings of the study provide a conclusive policy implication for the Community in order to build up 
capital formation. The first implication is subject to economic factors. The member governments of Community 
need to devise a mechanism of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign resource of grant and direct 
investment. Otherwise, it aggravates capital outflow in an illegal way at the cost of domestic economy. The 
macroeconomic policy towards foreign exchange rate has also a negative repercussion on capital flight in the 
situation of devaluing exchange rate. Therefore, governments also should reorient devaluation policy with rescuing 
countries from capital flight. Besides, the negative relationship between GDP and capital flight implies that both 
stable economic growth rate and remarkable GDP performance allow generating attractive investment 
environment and enabling to reduce capital outflow. The second policy implication is linked with political and 
institutional factor in the context of good governance. The respective government in the Community puts their 
unreserved endeavors in order to build political stability, state solidarity, and good governance.  
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Annex I: Explanation of Variables and Sources 
Variables Explanation Sources 
kf Capital flight calculated based on the Residual Method.  
It is also expressed in terms of constant 2010 USD 
dollars 
James K. Boyce and Leonce 
Ndikumana, Updated estimates, 1970-
2010, Political Economy Research 
Institute, PERI, University of 
Massachusetts, 2012. 
gdp Gross Domestic Product expressed in terms of constant 
2010 USD dollar. 
WB (2011), World Development 
Indicator online data base. 
fdi Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting 
economy. 
United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Foreign Direct 
Investment Online database. 
tg Total Grants, including technical cooperation  United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Foreign Direct 
Investment Online database. 
fx Official Exchange Rate IMF , online data base 
cpc Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. This index is 
rescaled to have higher values shows greater corruption 
so that  Corruption index= (Corruption control index *-
1) 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2013 updates, aggregator indicators of 
governance 1996-2012 
govregind This is an index of aggregating both governance 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. An index of 
governance effectiveness reflects perceptions of the 
quality of public services, civil service, policy 
formulation and implementation, credibility of the 
government and degree of its independence from 
political pressures. An index of regulatory quality index 
on the other hand reflects perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that allow private sector 
development. This index is rescaled as (effectiveness 
and regulatory quality indices *-1) to have higher values 
shows greater corruption. 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2013 updates, aggregator indicators of 
governance 1996-2012 
fisdef Fiscal Deficit, the gap between total revenue and total 
government expenditure 
IMF , online data base 
polity2 This variable is a modified version of the POLITY 
variable added in order to facilitate the use of the 
POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses.  It 
measures the combined index of autocracy and 
democracy level of a given country. 
POLITY™ IV PROJECT, 1800-2012, 
Dataset Users’ Manual, Monty G. 
Marshall Center for Systemic Peace and 
Societal-Systems Research Inc, Ted 
Robert Gurr University of Maryland 
(emeritus),  and Keith Jaggers Colorado 
State University (2013) 
sfi It measures the fragility of States in the area of 
economic Effectiveness, economic Legitimacy 
effectiveness, social Legitimacy, and political 
Legitimacy. 
Global Report 2011, Conflict, 
Governance, and State Fragility and 
Monty G. Marshall Benjamin R. Cole 
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Annex 2 
 
 
Annex 3  
 
 
Annex 4 
 
 
Annex 5 
 
            Prob > F =    0.4898
       F( 14,    49) =    0.98
 (14)  _It_2010 = 0
 (13)  _It_2009 = 0
 (12)  _It_2008 = 0
 (11)  _It_2007 = 0
 (10)  _It_2006 = 0
 ( 9)  _It_2005 = 0
 ( 8)  _It_2004 = 0
 ( 7)  _It_2003 = 0
 ( 6)  _It_2002 = 0
 ( 5)  _It_2001 = 0
 ( 4)  _It_2000 = 0
 ( 3)  _It_1999 = 0
 ( 2)  _It_1998 = 0
 ( 1)  _It_1997 = 0
. testparm _It*
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.1204
                              chi2(1) =     2.41
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u            0              0
                       e     561017.2       749.0108
                      kf     753078.6        867.801
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        kf[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
Based on 15 complete observations over panel units
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(10) =    17.706, Pr = 0.0601
__e5   0.0786  -0.1530  -0.2000  -0.4234   1.0000
__e4  -0.2723   0.3149   0.5477   1.0000
__e3  -0.5875   0.1551   1.0000
__e2  -0.2985   1.0000
__e1   1.0000
         __e1     __e2     __e3     __e4     __e5
Correlation matrix of residuals:
 
. xttest2
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.303
 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -1.027, Pr = 0.3045
 
 
. xtcsd, pesaran abs
